Destroying Monsters - Part One

By Mark Grueter

---------------------------------------

The bitter divide in opinion concerning Iraq reflects an age-old tradition in America. In the 1950's, historian and diplomat George Kennan captured the contradictory and the impatient nature of US attitudes to foreign policy. Essentially, Kennan argued that Americans are simultaneously isolationist and interventionist. Americans oscillate back and forth between a strong desire to either transform "alien" things or withdraw from them; we cannot live comfortably side by side with them, as they are.

Kennan's thesis contains more than a grain of truth. The George W. Bush administration is pursuing an interventionist/internationalist policy abroad while at the same time revealing its isolationist tendencies by employing tough go-it-alone rhetoric, eliminating certain protections for civil liberties, and reducing immigration.

Presently, however, unlike in any other time in the past, Americans literally cannot live comfortably side by side (or live at all) with individuals like Saddam Hussein and Osama bin Laden. Individuals as such want western civilization obliterated and they possess or will possess the weaponry and other means to possibly complete that task. So, it is us or them. Fortunately, because of technological advances and an enormous and highly skilled military, Americans no longer have to coexist with these types of people. They cannot win if the United States acts. But I will save that for later.

Reason for Doubt

Firstly, with regard to Iraq, there has been very little discussion of the alternatives to military intervention or regime change, or both. The argument goes as folllows: "More inspections," and/or a return to containment via sanctions no longer seem like viable long-term options. And if they are viable, they are not all that desirable. Moreover, in the event that the regime is ousted, leaders and citizens seem to know little about what will happen post-Saddam.

Critics of Bush's Iraq agenda warn that an invasion will "destabilize" the region, kill thousands upon thousands of innocent civilians, and make Westerners (and any other infidels) more, rather than less, vulnerable to attacks from Islamic extremists. Furthermore, many argue that the United States has never been a particularly talented nation-builder (Haiti is but one example cited) - a project we will need to be involved in, short of outright occupation and/or a takeover. These critics assert that Americans are restless, ethnocentric and hence, ineffective "imperialists" and nation-builders. Besides, imperialism is a fundamentally flawed doctrine, decadent, exploitative, if not racist. Turning Iraq into a democracy is impossible in the short-term, because the country has never had any democratic institutions.

Forcible removal of Saddam along with a successful transition will require occupation, and a long-standing, burdensome commitment to secure that transition. (A "transition" that will hopefully lead to, at least, a semi-democratic government not hell-bent on brutalizing its populace). Is the US ready for a neo-colonialist adventure? Look at the past: British imperialism might not be so reviled today, had it only followed through on its promises of looking out for the general welfare of its subjects, and not betrayed the very values it affected to promote. Is it likely that the US will be more willing to see it through than the British were?

And still further: Bush has a hidden agenda for initiating an attack on Iraq. The campaign is all about oil or geopolitics or some combination of the two. When he argues that it is principally about preventing a chemical, biological or nuclear attack on the United States, he is being dishonest. Doubters gleefully cite a CIA report from last year, which stated that Iraq is not a threat to the U.S. So, we can oppose Bush administration efforts primarily for its evident duplicity.

Calls from conservative politicians and think tanks to help liberate the people of Iraq are met with appropriate skepticism. Few believe these same Cold War hawks actually care about foreign peoples, as they were fairly open about their indifference to human rights not so long ago. Any regime - no matter how undemocratic and despicable - received cold warrior praise, so long as that regime did not flirt with socialism.

My fear actually stems from the indecisiveness of it all. This may seem paradoxical: Bush has not yet implemented his regime change policy, and has instead gone to Congress and the UN for approval, with several months elapsing. This suggests that there may be something inadequate about his scheme, after all. If the administration intends to do the right thing and is so sure of it, why the sudden patience, why the hesitation? Perhaps the potential negative consequences of an attack have not been fully appreciated by the proponents of regime change?

Two Approaches to Foreign Policy

Let us go back to some questions referenced earlier; (1) What are the alternatives to war, or even to regime change, assuming that the two are not necessarily one and the same, (2) Ideally speaking, what should strategists and humanists hope to see happen in the region, (3) Realistically, what would the international community and/or America like to see happen?

These are just some of the urgent issues our governors should be addressing. Too much time is spent rehashing the superficial talking points that come from both perspectives. Genuine dialogue is lacking. The real debate is receiving scant attention. This happens partly because, as hostilities rise, people hold firmly to their positions and become less and less willing to listen to anything that confronts their view. A degraded discourse is also a result of an unwillingness to study the complexities of the region, as competing sides tend to exaggerate - one way or the other - what will happen if there is an invasion - usually through tendentious and faith-based speculation. The third reason is that arguments are constantly being borrowed, swapped and annexed so that any discussion quickly turns into a redundant exercise.

I obviously do not have all the answers to the aforementioned questions. One can, however, state one's ideals for the region, and this is important in order to understand where the true divisions stem from. It would be interesting for the anti and pro-war thinkers to explore what, to them, would be the ideal situation for the region. Is there any agreement over ideals? (Of course, many will counter that it is not up to Westerners to decide. The "ideal" choice is to let these people live their own lives, establish their own society, with a bare minimum of outside influence).

Yet, one can examine this question further. Conventional commentary will frame the debate over Iraq as if all American factions essentially agree on what the ideal outcome should be: vaguely defined platitudes such as peace, freedom and democracy would prevail. Disagreement over methods and tactics for achieving those ideals is where the bulk of the controversy emanates, I am told. On the contrary, I submit that it is much more likely that the rancorous split over Iraq originates from varying ideas about what the world ought to look like. There are more profound and underlying issues at work here, which better explain the fundamentals of this divide (a separate essay would be needed to wholly address these basic differences in belief systems). Lastly, anti and pro-regime change forces have notably distinct conceptions of what role the United States should play in the world.

There are two contending foreign policy traditions in America. John Quincy Adams' famous line best represents one of them, when he warned future generations to avoid going abroad "in search of monsters to destroy." People left Europe for the new world to get away from conquest and colonialism. Americans, mindful of history, have since feared becoming "bogged down" in foreign affairs. We also see this philosophy reflected with later populist politicians like William Jennings Bryan and today with leftist writers like Gore Vidal or conservative figures like Patrick Buchanan. This sentiment largely prevailed in America up until the First World War. Today, the feeling lingers, and it is sold as a call to shun "empire" in favor of republicanism.

The other tradition is more interventionist; Woodrow Wilson probably best represents it. His idea for the League of Nations and a new type of liberal internationalism was an astonishingly ambitious new doctrine, and it grew popular during the first part of the 20th century, partly as a response to the Russian revolution. Wilson hoped to convert the world to the ideas of John Lockian liberty. His uncompromising approach though ("if it won't work, it must be made to work") ultimately failed, as he might have known it would have.

Wilson may have taken it too far, but his heart was in the right place. Liberal ideals ought not be imposed on other countries, so that leaves us with the higher notion of self-determination. Today, most peoples in the world have been exposed to the ideas of democracy, liberalism and openness in some shape or form. What if North Koreans and Iraqis were able to determine for themselves what type of government to install, without having to fear an untimely death as a consequence for stating their preferences?

Wilson hoped to coerce other nations into adopting western-style democracy. The coercion would have been necessary at that time, because many nations would not have opted for that type of government on their own. Today, it appears as though coercion is no longer necessary, and this helps to justify and explain the merits of regime change. It sounds simple in theory: the US and its allies can actually liberate peoples by expelling their dictators, helping to create the conditions for self-determination - the wager being that self-determination will inevitably lead to increased democratization and liberalization in countries like Iraq - ideas and values that will likely spread throughout the surrounding regions if the effect, in this example, is increased living standards within Iraq. There is popular support in "the Arab street" for Western ideals, especially with the younger generation. If this bet pays off it will bode well for world peace, since history has shown that liberal democratic countries do not wage war with one another.

The prospect is exciting and not entirely unrealistic; in fact, its plausible nature is what truly irritates some of the critics. Many scholars have based their whole careers on the insistence that Middle-Eastern countries cannot be democratized by way of external assistance. A successful campaign in Iraq threatens reputations, and an entire school of academic thought.

Other doubters, who cynically equate "democratization" and "globalization" with "Americanization," - the latter thought of strictly in a pejorative sense - will despise it for another reason. The trend of globalization tends to promote usually Western, market-oriented values, while uprooting traditional and local cultural, political and religious values. There is a direct link between the anti-globalization and antiwar movements. For instance, both would consider the presence of McDonald's in, say, Baghdad a revolting and even a sinister spectacle -whereas I would find the site petty and unattractive, but more importantly, a sign of integration and progress.

Nobody wants to occupy Iraq for any longer than necessary. And the US government certainly has no intention of colonizing the country. Anyone that still invokes the word "imperialism" to describe American desires for the region is either knowingly or unknowingly abusing the word. By definition, not even the most ardent, Christian, neo-conservative hawks have any "imperialistic" dreams for Iraq or anywhere else. Bush strategists genuinely hope free, secular societies will emerge, principally because it is perceived to be in U.S. national interests for that to happen. Conscientious liberals and independent thinkers can support this doctrine as well, confident that human rights and living conditions will improve as an intended or unintended consequence. Additionally, the process of globalization (which, by the way, automatically destroys colonialism in practice) is working almost independently, although inconsistently, to achieve this liberal, egalitarian and democratic end...

Click here to read part two of this essay.

---------------------------------------

Mark Grueter lives in New York City, where he is pursuing his master's in Liberal Studies at the New School University's Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science.  He can be contacted at grueter4@yahoo.com.

 

© 2003 Me Three